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Next to avoiding nuclear war, 1t is often believed that 
nutur1ng and sustaining a creative working relaionshlp with the 
European Community (EC) is one of the most urgent tasks facing 
the United States today in the world, The economic interest 
of the United States in fostering interdependence with 
the European Economic Community (EEC) ls obvious . The combinJed 
populatinn of the EEC ls larger than that of the United States 
and a recent survey showed that the combined oopula.tion by 1980 
will exceed that of the United States by some JO million people, 
The same survey projects a rate of real economic growth over 
decade of 65.3% a year (for the six original EEC natlons), a percentage 
point more than predicted for the United States and a J.6 % growth 
rate for the United Kingdom. The industrial productl0n should 
grow at an annual rate of 5. 4,i during the decade, at least haH' a 
percentage point faster than the U.S. 1 
The expanded Community(i.e, since 1972 including Great Britain~. 
Ireland, and Denmark) is the world's most important commerclaJ 
power for the U.S. Using 1971 figures, the Nine bought 25.4% 
($11.2 billion) of the U.S. exnorts. The same year, the U.S. sold 
the Community of Nine 22.8 % ($10.4 billion) of its exports. It ls 
expected that the Nine will continue to import much more than 
they export into the forsee~ble future. Thus, though an enlarged 
Community may prove to be somewhat more of a. threat to the U.S., 
by virtue of the fact that it 1s also a richer client, the United 
States shoold b~neftt from this union. Moreover, as the U.S. 
has felt sinr,e the end of world war II, a "strong" Europe should 
cause the internat1.unal economic system to function better than if 
it remained in the condition it was before the Jviershall Plan. 2 
Profile of Enlarged Community 
Nine 
Area (thousand sq, miles) 
Population (millions) 
589 
253 
694.5 
6J.2 
64. ?, 
GNP ($billions) 
Exports '' 
Imports" 
,%World exnorts 
% World imports 
27,6 
24,3 
Source: European Community Statistical Office 
J,600 
:>05.4 
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44,1 
JJ.5,6 
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16.5 
According to the Grand Design of John Kennedy, "We do not 
regard a strong and united ~urope as a ri~ral, but a partner ••• capable 
of playing a greater role in the common needs of poorer nations, of 
joining with the u.s. and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving 
problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing 
coordinated policies in all economies and diplornatic areas ••• " 3 
With a relative shift from quasi-military confr0ntatlons of 
the Cold War to the civilian and political nr0cesses charaterizing 
the increasing interdependence of industrial societeis, the Europeans 
will have to assert their political, economic, and technical identity 
if they want some degree of independence from the United States 
and the Soviet Bloc. 
Such a growth away from the traditional bi-polarity concept 
tow~rds the pentagonal-polarity concept of Andrew F1erre, has 
raised some doubts and fears among many Americans, Jacob Javitz 
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the RenubJ. ic C!..n senator from New York has said, "I regret s& c 
that the EEC 1s increasingly taking on the aopearance of a narrow, 
inward-looking protectionist bloc whose trade nolicies ••• increastngly 
discri~inate against non-members ••• " 4 This is by no means 
an isolated c~ase as oninions of this sort have been heard since 
the very beginnings of the Community. Thus, if one is to ~ut 
the policies of the U.S. towards the EEC in its proper perspective 
amidst the accusations of protectionism, discrimination, and 
isolationism, he must examine the perceptions of Europeans concerning 
.. 
Americans vis-a-vis the iuropean Community. 
Europeans tend to emphasize the fact that traditionally 
America has been all-powerful in tne realms of military, economic, 
and political affairs, so that it has always been easy for her 
to sneak of Atlantic partnership from a position of un-challenged 
strength, Europeans would continue to say that the United States 
has supported the European unification on the basis that although 
there might be a cost in economic terms, the United St_ates was 
ready to accept this because such unity would have political 
advantages, To the Europeans, the U.S. has been disaopointed as 
the economic unification has far out-paced the political unity! 
not justifying the economic costs. The growth of the H.lC has 
also coincided with problems in balance of payments, frustrations 
in Vietnam, inflation, and other domestic problems. Europeans 
feel that the United States has viewed not only their progress, 
but also that of the Japanese, in the words of one Community offtcial, 
as a c,\1rent who has raised his deccndent children woul rl 1ie11: an 
"arrogant ,,dol s:·cent", as a child who h·.f,, 011tsrnarted a oarcmt 
threaten 
I 
' . 
the U.S. domestic market. In addition, the ~uropeans are eager 
to point out the fact the United States: has had a trade surplus 
in ~estern ~urope and this part of the world should not be 
"punished" as the Community feels W3.S the case with the 10% surchai:.....ge 
of 15 August 1971, which has since been lifted as of Decernber,1971, 
The State Department in its turn, would exnlain the European 
perceptlon alnng different lines. fhe oririnal drive towardsthe 
Community wae the result of the threat of the Soviet Unton at a 
time when economically as well as politically, li:urope was still 
quite dependent upon the United States ~conomic conditions 
have since changed and Europe has become more independent and 
more sensitive rea11zinv that her security still depends upon 
the U.S. though she is more·emancipated economically. 
A feeling of resentment has also been the result of the 
super-power diploma.cy. Europe has a sense of somewhat helplessness 
and resents the fact that often she is not consulted by the U.S., 
as in the recent case concerning the October war in the Middle· 
~as~. Added to all this, is of course the fact that the nations 
of Europe have very old cultures which are very traditional, 
resulting in a great sense of pride which has been damaged. In 
order for foreign policies to be successful, both sides must 
recognize these differing perceptions in order to achieve meaningful 
cooperation. Too much is at st-ake should this cooperatJon not 
be realized, 
On 25March 1957, the Treaty of Rome was drafted which became 
effective on 1 January 1958. The treaty proposed to create a 
European Economic Community.through, a)progressive reductions and 
....... 
·:;i 
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removal of all fiscal and physical restrictions on the free 
movement of goods, capital, and persons among member countries: 
b) harmonization of their economic policies; and c) consolidation 
of their external tariffs into one uniform tariff· system 
applicable to all inputs into the EC, from the rest of the world. 
On 1 January 1959, ~ariffs and other trade restrictions were 
I 
abolished among the original six member states. By 1q62, they had 
achieved adoption of a Common External Tariff (CET) and by 1968 
the coµntries were internally tariff-free. 
How all of this has affected the United States can be viewed 
in two different sectors, the field of industry and that of 
agriculture. In the period of 1960-1970, U.S. nonagricultural 
exports to the EC grew from 12.9 bi1lion to a level of #6.9billion, 
while nonagricultural imports grew from ~2.0 billion to ,6.2 
s billion. It must be remembered howeverever,that in analyzing 
trade patterns, conclusions can be only speculative as one can 
never be sure of what the situation may have been had the EEC never 
existed. 
In nonagricultural trade and particularly in manufacturing, 
external tariffs have been significantly lowered, thanks most 
' recently to the Kennedy Round concluded in 1967, and are now .at 
moderate levels of about 8%. In this area~. U.S. exports to 
Community countries have increased very greatly, especially in 
high-technology industries. More than twenty such industries 
have enioyed continuous increases every year since 1960. They 
include cars, trucks, and their parts with exports of $4.1 billion 
in 1971, up more than 1J8% since 1965: electronic cnmnuters and 
parts wurtl1 ,1.1 billion, a gain of J4J% since 1965, and chemicals 
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worth $),8 billion, up 58% since 1965, ? 
In addition to exoorts, most of these industries are 
also involved in the European Community in a different context, 
that being direct investment in the form of subsidiaries of 
American based, "mult 1-nat ional" corporations. The facts, , 
insofar as they oan be reliably estimated, appear to show an 
increase in direct U.S. investment in the EEC of Six from under 
~2 billion in 1958 to around $1) billion in 1970, By 1968, U.S. 
subsidiarie8 were selling $14 billion in products and repatriating 
in 1970 some $1 billion in nrofits. 
Such figures have prompted many Europeans to look more closely 
at the American corporation in Europe, Calling this investment 
Le Def1 Americ9.ln (The American Challenge), author-politician Jean-
Jacques Servan-Schreiber sees the third largest industrial power 
in the world in 15 years to be not Europe, after the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union, but American industry in,Europe. According to 
him, "The Common Market has become a new Far i,est for American 
businessm.en, Their investments do not so much involve a transfer 
of capital as an actual seizure of nower at the heart of tbe 
8 il:uropean economy. " For many, this is greatly to be feared and 
the history behind it must be exposed if the nr,blem is to be 
understood, 
As Europe was recovering after the war and concentrating on 
rebuilding a crushed ecnnomy, American industry .-·as benefitting 
greatly frnm technological experience ga\n0d during the war aided 
tremendously by the development of very good manegeria 1. "know hYw". 
As i£urope' s economic cnndit10n gadual ly improved and e. '110're toward 
unity begun, it was precisely this advanced technology and tetter 
-7-
) 
management that enabled Amertcan corp,1rat ions to move in and take 
advantage of a more unified Europe. S~rvan-Schreiber has noted 
that as the Europeans spoke of bringing the countries i.nto 
closer economic cooperatio11, it was the Americans who were actually 
able to benefit. 
The situation has modified to an extent today and as a result, 
a certain paradox has developed as far as American invest~ent ls 
concerned. There are those Europeans on one side who believe in 
the threat of the "American Challenge" and O"Dosite them one 
sees those who clearly recognize the advantages of American 
investment and technology. Many have sugcested that the real 
purpose of Le D~fi Americai.n was to serve more as a st1mu]us to 
~uro;:,eans than as an attacl~ aga i.nRt American industry. 3ervaYl-
Schre1ber admits that ~uro~ea~s must learn ~he "~,o~-how" and 
develop tte tec)A.nol ogy if tr.ey are +:." co:opete successfully 1-i. +-.h 
exlstin;:,; American firlj)G. 
Accor.dl°F to one Com11erce Dept. of:i.c1al, 1:.,uropems basically 
like U.S. i'1vest'llent with the new jobs, technology, ~nd cap 1_tal 
that accompany it. He feels however, that there is great suspicion, 
especially when a European reads an account of the ITT affair in 
Chile, but he continues by saying that for the most part, co~ntries 
such as Denmark are more interested in just plain knowing what 
these corporations are doing rather than fighting them. 
~hether Europeans actually like the idea of American companies 
in ii:urope, or whether theirs is 8n 3.ttitude of suspicious 
tolerance, an executive of General ~lectric sees it more as a 
nragmatic question. Euroneans recognize the ben~fits of U.S. 
investment especially in the fields of advanced technology and 
electronics, and accordinply take advantage of them. According 
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to this source, as lon~ as the u.s. stays ahead of the Buropeans 
in these areas, investment is relatively secure, It is once 
this "technological gap" narrows that the position of the Am~rican 
multi-national corporation will be weakened. 
On the whole, it would aopear that the formation of the iEC 
has had positive value for international firms, As has been 
mentioned before, it appears that American corporations have¥up 
until now generally been better able t0 take advantage of the 
flowering of the EEC. Now however, the d:C Commission has drafted 
an ambitious blueprint for a common industrial nolicy to 
promote a genuine European industrial network and there are 
questions to be raised. Included in the plan are measures to 
speed up removal of technical barriers to trade within the Com·non 
Market, liberalization of ac~ess to ~ublic contracts, the abolition 
of tax frontiers, formulation of a European capital market, and 
a common statute for a European company. Once enacted, this policy 
will attempt to foster conditions encouraging and enabling European 
companies~ to take advantage of the Common Market now being 
perfected. When such programs are implemented, will an American 
firm in Europe still be able to profit as well as its iuropean 
counterpart? Once again, speculation is only quasi-reliable, but 
it would seem as though the Community wll~- continue to follow non-
discriminatory policies as long as these firms do not appear to 
be taking over ~uropean firms. 
At present, accordin[.r, to an official of the European Commun! tf, 
a subsidiary carries the natJ_onality of the particular country in 
which it is established, That ls to say, taking Belgium isso as 
an example, the oil company is considered to a be a Belgium company 
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enjoying the advantages and/or disadvantages of any other firm in 
the country. what may change in the future however, would be the 
conditions under which a foreign firm is established within the 
Community. At present, as in the past, American firms have found 
incentives in various countries consisting mainly of tax breaks. 
It is thought that this sort of incentive should level off with 
new policies, though not in a discriminatory manner. 
At a press conference in 1970 at the National Press Club 
in Washingtonv French President Georges Pompidou was asked to what 
extent he would accept entry of American investment in France. 
His reply seems to reflect the general European attitudes: 
I am in favor of the free movement of canital: 
nothing pleases me more than when large French 
companies invest abroad, in the U.S. and given 
the means they have, I am also pleased that American 
companies can invest in France. I simply say 
that I hope these investments represent not only 
for the companies making them, but also for 
France an enrichment. That is why, in the 
present situation we sometimes oppose certain 
investments. Those which we are led to oppose 
consist in the take-over of French cnncerns by 
foreign companies ••• On the whole, whenever a 
foreign investment is a real investment, 
bringing us something, neveloping our prodnction 
capacity, our research capacities, our export 
capacities,
9
not only do we agree to it, but we 
want it ••• 
As the European Community has developed, and as it has attempted 
to provide advantages for the member-states, two major bones of 
contention have evolved between it and the United States. The 
U.S. has c_riticiZf:d nothinp: more than the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAl-') of the Community and the preferential trade agreements 
the Communit~has with mqny African states as well as several 
Mediterrane~n and other European countries. 
\ . ., 
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rhe CAP has incur.red the wrath ()f American AdminjRtrations 
since its completion in the mid-sixties. u.~. com~laints are 
best summarized in the "white-paper" of December 1971 • 
••• The Community has developed an agricultural 
policy which satisfies the political needE of 
their ar,risectors at the expense of its own 
comsumers and outsiders. Th•s system, based 
u~on very high support ririces, is designPd to limit 
other non-member nations to role of residual 
suppliers ••• Since the domestic surolLlses are 
priced to0 high for world competition, a·~ressive 
subsidization is used to nush the surpluses into 
the traditional markets of othmDre efficient 
suppliers. lO 
rhe Community's farm policy replaces serarate policies of the 
member states with a sinele policy. It is designed to open up trade 
among the members, and to increase the efficiency of Co11munit-,y 
farming ~ithout workinp farmers becoming helples~ victims of 
agrarian reform. 
A levy is imposed on many pro~ucts imported into the Common 
Market that compete with Community farm products. In many cases, 
the internal price level is substantially higher (wheat, as one 
example) than the price of imported goods. The levy serves to 
protect the relatively inefficient Common Market far~Ar. rhe 
receipts are paid into the Community's common farm funds Rnd 
the proceeds are used to reimburse governments for the cost of 
intervening in the food market to hold prices at guarante-d minimal 
levels and to support certain farm exoorts enabling them to 
compete in world m~rkets. The fund is also used to flnance the 
modernization of the Common Market's farm economy, still vastly 
inefficient. as compared to that of the U,8. 
American exports of agricultural products covered by the 
variable levies and other elements of the system fell by 47% from 
LJuu -1yo9, then rnse sli ntly in 1969-1971, ~ha~ bslperl ease 
the adverse effr;cts of the CI-\.P w,re ·_,_1rocluct.c: "'lch -r·, ,._ 
, - C,. c'•,ci 30.)'ueans ~ 
vere not covered by the variable levy system. I/ 
h~..r One 2:tP'o;:ie·~n ~nswer to American protests r Q e been tl"at 
AmeriGan farm exports to the EC hB.ve grown :l..n s-:ilte of the CAP. 
rhts has been consld8red as only a partial answer because 
1)w1thout the CAJ: they mi[jht have grown more 2) for three years 
after 1966 they decl\ned as the c~p was reaching full effect 
and their exranslon in 1970 may be due to temporary f~ctors, J) 
in spite of the level of the 1970 ex~ansion, products subject to 
vari:1.ble levies, the most cha"acterlstic CAP device, have 
decli~ed faster ~h~n others, which seems to mean that the policy 
12 is working the W3.Y one W:)'.J]rl ex s)ect • 
Ihe European Community also offe s another exolanatton as 
to the greater degree of exoortation of "levy-fr0e" soybeans as 
compared to other grains such as wheat. 3ince soybeans in themse: 
are more rrotein-rlch than other feed grains sold to livestock 
farmers. in order to improve their product, these farmers have 
chosen increasingly the purchase of soybeans. Sine~ the actual 
consu:npt ion of the l 1vestock is a f 1nite amount, the A.mer i can pro~: 
of soybeans and those of other feed grains are in competition 
with one another with the soybean producers win~ing out. 
In reality though, the entire situation involving the CAf 
has been greatly modified within the past year. Because of a~ 
excepttonally bad harvest, the .Soviet Union entered into wo.rld 
markets for large r::uant 1 t ie.c; of cere9.ls which it br1 11pht from thn 
U.~., Canada, Australia, and the 2JC. The 3oviet Gurchasn, coupled 
with strong d2mands from all sources in general, created heavy 
press11re on supplies ar1d 11rices , and led a number of countries to 
~~ 
I 
i 
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place controls on their agricultural exnorts, Thus, the U.S. placed 
an embargo on the exportation of soybeans. 
Officials and economists in both the U.S. and the EC have now 
realized that should there be poor crops in a few major nroducing 
countries, the world would be without the reserves needed to meet 
food requirements. Because of the realization of this possibility, 
the issue between the U,3, and the EC has now become one of how 
to share a scarce supply of food, In order to meet the problem, 
two areas must ... -••• be examined. 
The first is that of trying to reduce high levels of 
agriculturalprotection so as to make more effective use of the world's 
agricultural resources,. and the other is providing assurances that 
farm products will be available in sufficient quantities to meet 
all likely contingencies, No one questions the fact that the highest 
degree of cooperation by all nations is a. prime prerequisite for 
solving the problem. 
The question of preferential trade agreements however, is 
still producing strong sentiments and it remains a very sensitive 
issue for the U.S. By the fall of 1972, the Community had concluded 
agreememts on reciprocal trade preferences with 36 countries •. A 
/ 
single association agreement, the Yaounde Convention covers arrangements 
with 22 of them, all former African dependencies including Burundi, 
Cameroon, Centrafrican Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Voltaic Republic, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalla, Chad, Togo, Zaire, 
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, B.nd .Mauritius, 'rhe U.S. is particularly 
opnosed to the "reverse" tariff preferences ~hich most of these 
countries grant i::c export~r..r. The U.S. special representative 
for trade negotiations has noted, " ••• There is no economic or 
development rationale that can justify the extension of 'reverse' 
preferences by developing countries to the industriali?ed nations 
of Western Europe." lJ 
The preferential agreements fall basically into three categories: 
1) Special Relationship preserving a special trade relationship 
I 
with one or more of the Communtiy members1before the ~iC' s establishment 
I 
or enlargement, 2)European Candidates Agreememnts concluded with 
European nations which hooe to become full members of the E~C but 
which cannot now take on the economic and political obligations of 
full membership(eg. Greece and i:ipain), J) Associates' competitors -
Mediterranean and African nations which have sought association 
with the community because their exports to Western ~urope traditionally 
compete with those from other associated countries. 
For the United St~tes, the "reverse" preferences are more irritating 
vlf""' 
than the others, however the actual econ,)mic effect -11111 the U.S. 
due to both the preferences and the "reverse" preferences has 
depended largely uoon the stage of development of the countries in 
question. Most damaging, has been the effect of these agree:nents 
upon u.s. citrus fruit ex0orters, most notably those in Arizona 
and California. More importantly however, in the eyes of U.S. 
government officials, has been the steady deterioration in adherence 
to the most favored nation principle on which the General Agreementt 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the whole postwar conception of 
the world trading system has rested. 
~ith a shift of relative power i~ the GATT to the ~uronean 
Community and its associated countri•.·2, ~he most-favored nation 
principle has bePn sAriously under~ined. iurope0ns will ~tate that 
•·· ..• '',;.. ',J~_ .. _: 
' -· ' ,.,. .i.. , ·, -Ji 
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Americans too, h;;JF :1ol,<:ited the GATT ru]e:=; especially ty the 
U.S,-Canad~ 0 uto ~gr~emPnt, however Commerce Dert, off~cials will 
under the (:ATT' for j..his tr':l.de. 
The prime American conce~n in regard to trade agreements is 
that the Community seems to take the position that the results 
count in the end, while the breach of principles do not count at 
all. The Community is pragmatic in its policy, and it can be 
characterized as being disinterested in international principles, 
except where such principles may provide some short-term advantage. 
It is for this l'.'eason that t 1 e U.S. onposes unfair trade agreements 
(the U.S. does not i.n principle object to preferences given to 
lesser developed n~t~ons) and would like to seP them "go by the 
boards" in the words of one Cormerce Dept. official. 
At some point in a discussion concerning the EEC, a very 
serious question must be looked at concerning the validity of dealing 
with the European Community ( the EC is comprised specifically of the 
EEC, European Coal and Steel Community-ECSC, and the European Atomic 
Community- EURATOM) as a sovereign entity as opposed to dealing 
with Nine independent countries who have concluded some very 
meaningful economic agreements. To what extent has each individual 
nation surrendered a pnrtion of its sovereignty? It would se~m 
at this point in time that the individual nations are still 
very much in control and with the strong natloallstic feelings one 
finds especially on the part of the French, the future uniflcati~n 
of the Com~un1ty can he questioned. 
In the economic arena, the Nine nations have gone as far as 
they can without having to give up political power. The Feruary1971 
decision to form full economic and monetary union show how concrete 
14 
• 
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achieve'Tlents in the field of trade sr:11_1 into the pr)litical realm 
qs a result of need. The sovereign states united fifteen years 
ago, have recognized that in order to maintain the union, some national 
prerogatives may have to be modified. 'rhey have relinquished some 
control over monetary and economic policy, but any relaxation of 
control over national budgets, taxes, credit, and money supply is a 
difficult political choice. 
As for now, the United States is dealing ~ainly with each 
sovereign state though not losing si~ht of the importance of 
maintaining good relations with the EC in Brussels. In fact, 
there is a deleg~tion representing the ~u~opean Community in 
Washington, and the United States has a delegation led by an 
ambassador in Brussels. According to State Department officials, 
each country represents its own national interest and the U.S. often 
tries to apneal to this particular interest, however the iC at times 
is more important as it is the Commission of the EC that drafts 
proposals and many times develops compromises. For businesses, 
the individual nation remains predominant in dealings. 
The Community by no means ignores this situation and they realize 
the confusion that can result for outsiders because of the two levels 
of sovereignty. In hif'l review of US-EC relations before the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg on 16 January of this year, Sir Christopher 
Soames, Vice President of the Commission of the European 
Communities comments, 
At the moment when proposals c~me from the 
Commission, on whatever topic- I do not 
say whether any narticular Droposals are 
good or bad- at least they come out as 
1~11,.../'"lrie::iri nrorn~R,.r-": l'n1a R.T'P r.once1ven q R 
such. They are then discussed in the 
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Council of Ministers and in the member c0untries 
as national problems and are thrown into the 
national arena ••• Let us realiae how difficult 
it is for our partners ••• Let us realize how 
it is for them when they do address themselves 
to the chairman in office of the Council of 
Ministers. All he can say is, 'I take note 
of what you say and I wil! renort it to the 
Council of Ministers' " 
The U.S. has an inteTest in further iuropean integration but 
cannot play a major part in bringing it about for that is up to 
the iuropeans. The U.3. can however, have some influence on what 
happens, less in terms of relations among the C.::uropean communities 
than their relations with the rest of the ~orld, 
It is com~only believed that an integrated ~urope should be 
able to help more effectively than a divided one in managing the 
international economic system, Conse~uently, American policy 
will be especially concerned with the relation of an integrating 
iurope to the rest of the world ec0nomy as a whole. Therefore, it 
must be realiz;ed that some short-run and ')erhaps even s0roa.long-run 
economic disadvantages for outside countries may occur. It sho11ld 
be an objective of American policy to minimize these disadvantages. 
The U.S. must have a flexible stance, being able to deal with a 
common a8ency on one subject, and with separate nat1.onal governments 
16 on others. 
In attempting to influence the future course of events of the 
Ji:uropeFtn Co;nmuni ty, the United .Sta t .-,s can and should sur,iport those 
forces who seek an out ward-looking Co~unity with liberal economic 
policies toi;ard the rest of the world. In tt·is way, the U.S. ma.y 
be able to encourage \Jestern ~urope to give its external economic 
relatlor1s a hisher relative priority in the years to come of 
unificatlon. 
.. 
. .. 
.. 
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rrhe Committe(' for L~Conomic Development stresses two lessons 
b,e 
thq t ca,1.Alearned since ,,orld vi8.r II. 1) mu: t Ur; t "raJ agreements 
and !n~titutions provide t}:~ ~ost succesfful mea~s for resoving 
bilater,,.l economic c.orJlL;t.s; ·:,nri 2) in all major industriali::-ed 
nat lons, there a.re important policy concerns ,ino , 01ner rul domest le 
interests which run ap<1inst the concert of internatlonal collective 
act ion. iurope -J:>.d r.he U. u. h,we a common interest in modern1zi:'lg 
and revitalizing the internat1onal institutions and rules, and 
adc1ing s0me n'3w mechanisms Khich would increase flexibility and 
efficiency in economic relationships. 
The subjAct areas to which multilateral institutions and rules 
should be directed, according to the C~D, c~ver the whole range of 
international economic relations including unf~ir competitive 
nractices, including t~e practices to which our counter-vailing 
duty laws apply; and nontariff distortions of trde, such as nuotas, 
discriminatory government procurement, technical sta'1dards, end 
standards for health and safety. l? 
One Community official sees the real problem confronting future 
relations between the U.S. and the EC as keeping in perspective the 
differences arising in face of various policies. The Commission 
meets twice a year with the State Dept. as well as various other 
governmental agencies and it is imperative that these exchanges 
continue and to a large extent become more meaningful ann productive. 
In all areas of neeotiation, the actions on the_part of all the 
actors involved must 2uard acai'1st the negative as,,fcts of extre'Tie 
nattonalism and/or reglnnalism 1~ the realm of intern~tional 
relations. 
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